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I. INTRODUCTION
By January 1956 the Montgomery Bus boycott was in fullswing. Black citizens in Montgomery, Alabama, were refusing to ride
the city’s private buses to protest racially segregated seating. At the
midpoint of the twentieth century, protests against racial segregation
in the South generally, and Montgomery specifically, raised serious
and dangerous problems for Montgomery’s black community. 1 The
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
** Class of 2018, Boston University School of Law.
1. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History
of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1005–10 (1989). White officials
and business leaders in Montgomery were not happy about the bus boycott. Predictably, black leaders of the boycott “were threatened, and verbal intimidation was

101

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200528

2018
AM

102

1105 Maclin Reconcile WLR Clean Copy

(DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019 11:13

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 48

bus boycott also presented practical concerns for African Americans
living and working in Montgomery. “To a largely uneducated people
among whom the most common occupations were maid and day laborer, the loss of what was for many their most important modern convenience—cheap bus transportation—left them with staggering problems of logistics and morale.” 2 The problems for the black community
worsened when the Montgomery police commissioner threatened to
arrest taxi drivers who charged black boycotters less than the minimum
forty-five-cent fare. 3 In response to this threat, the black community
organized a car-pool system that would transport bus boycotters
throughout the city. 4
On the afternoon of January 26, 1956, twenty-seven-year-old
Martin Luther King Jr. had finished his day of work at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery. 5 On his drive home, King
stopped his vehicle to offer a ride to a group of bus boycotters standing
at a downtown car-pool location. 6 After the boycotters entered King’s
car, two motorcycle policemen pulled-in behind King’s vehicle.7
While everyone in King’s car tried to remain calm, the police continued to follow King’s car. 8 At the next car-pool location, when some
of King’s passengers began to exit, one of the policemen pulled next
to King’s window, stating: “Get out, King. You’re under arrest for
speeding thirty miles an hour in a twenty-five-mile zone.” 9 While
stunned by the police action, King did not protest. He was arrested and

quickly superseded by potentially lethal force as bombs were detonated at the homes
of [Martin Luther King Jr.] and [E.D.] Nixon,” an elder statesman of black civil rights
activists in Montgomery. Id. at 1027–28 (citations omitted).
2. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954–63, at 145 (1988).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 160.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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taken to the Montgomery City Jail where he was processed, fingerprinted, and jailed with other black prisoners, including a schoolteacher who was also arrested during the bus boycott. 10
Even in 1956, stopping (and arresting) blacks for petty or nonexistent offenses had a long-standing pedigree. In America, police targeting blacks for arbitrary and disproportionate searches and seizures
is a tradition as old as the nation itself. 11 What happened to King is
known as an investigatory or “pretext” stop. The pretext for the stop
was the commission of a traffic offense—allegedly driving thirty miles
per hour in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone—but the real reason to
stop and arrest King had nothing to do with the alleged speeding violation. On the contrary, the Montgomery police wanted to intimidate
King and send a message to Montgomery’s black community.
It has been over sixty years since Martin Luther King Jr. was
subjected to this arbitrary and discriminatory police practice.[JH: it has
been more than sixty years since 1956] Surely, things have changed
in America. After the demise of the Jim Crow system, the enactment
of federal civil rights legislation protecting blacks from discriminatory
application of state and local laws, 12 as well as several decades of Supreme Court rulings enforcing the rights of black citizens, 13 it would
seem that law enforcement officials can no longer perform this type of
arbitrary and bigoted policing.
A. Pretext Stops in America
Although much has changed in America, investigatory or pretext stops unfortunately remain ubiquitous. As in King’s case, these

10. Id.
11. SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND
THE CAROLINAS 110 (2001) (citation omitted) (describing the laws that required black
slaves who traveled beyond their homes to possess slave passes: “Slave patrols frequently looked at slave passes while making their rounds. Laws required the slave to
carry a pass, or ticket, from her master, which permitted the slave to leave the plantation. A specific pass stated the slave’s name, where she had permission to go, on
what date, how long the pass was good for . . . and bore the owner’s signature.”).
12. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Browder v. Gayle, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200528

1105 Maclin Reconcile WLR Clean Copy

2018
AM

104

(DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019 11:13

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 48

stops are not aimed at enforcing the traffic code. Rather, police “making investigatory stops commonly have decided to carry out a criminal
investigation before they make the stop; they then identify, or create, a
pretext to justify the stop.” 14 Put differently, a pretext stop is a police
practice “where the intent is not to sanction a driving violation but to
look for evidence of more serious criminal wrongdoing.” 15 Various
types of law enforcement agencies utilize pretext stops, and high-ranking police officials endorse pretext stops as a crime control measure.16
Indeed, over two decades ago investigatory stops were given a major
boost when the federal government actively encouraged state and local
police departments to use traffic laws as a basis for stopping cars suspected of drug smuggling. 17
14.

CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE
59 (2014); id. at 8 (“The investigatory stop is made not to enforce
traffic laws or vehicle codes but to investigate the driver. Is this driver carrying a gun
or illegal drugs? What is he up to? Why is he in this neighborhood? Is there a warrant
for his arrest?”). Because police cannot conduct a stop without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of a crime or traffic violation, “most investigatory stops are
nominally justified by minor violations.” Id.
15. Id. at 30. A traffic code is well suited for pretext stops because police
“may manipulate [the traffic laws] ‘to justify detention and interrogation of persons
suspected of more serious crimes.’” Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
129, 157 n.126 (2017) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE
A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 87–88 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965)). When used in this
manner, the traffic code is the equivalent of a vague statute. Id.; see also LAFAVE,
supra, at 87–89 (noting that police use vague laws as pretext to investigate suspicious
persons).
16. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 10 (“Although police departments differ in
many ways—big cities versus small towns, urban departments versus state highway
patrol agencies, traditional versus progressive agencies—the investigatory stop has
spread widely among these agencies.”); id. at 12 (citation omitted) (“Police officers
particularly believe that investigatory stops are among their most effective tools for
finding and arresting criminals and preventing crimes. In many departments, very
large proportions of all arrests are made in ‘routine’ investigatory traffic stops.”).
Even after racial profiling became politically unacceptable in the 1990s, “every official condemnation of racial profiling by the leaders of professional policing was accompanied in its official text by a full-throated defense of investigatory stops.” Id. at
49 (citation omitted).
17. See EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 27 (noting that pretext stops were revived
and encouraged, in part, through “research by policing scholars claiming that investigatory stops were among professional policing’s most effective crime-fighting tools,”
AND CITIZENSHIP
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When discussing police stops it is important to distinguish between pretext stops, which are fishing expeditions for criminality, and
ordinary traffic stops, which are performed to genuinely enforce the
traffic code or to promote traffic safety. During ordinary traffic stops,
“officers’ discretionary choices are focused on traffic-law violations.” 18 A pretext stop is a very different police tactic: “The distinction between traffic-safety and investigatory stops is the key to sorting
out how and when race matters in police stops.” 19

and the “development of remarkably detailed knowledge about how, tactically, to effectively carry out these stops; Gary Webb, DWB [Driving While Black], ESQUIRE,
Apr. 1999, at 118,C reprinted in ESQUIRE, Jan. 29, 2007, https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a1223/driving-while-black-0499/ (describing Operation
Pipeline, which was the federal program designed to identify drug couriers on the
nation’s highways).[JH: per BB 1.4 books should come first] This body of knowledge
grew out of the federal government’s war on drugs and the police training provided
as part of that initiative, which spread ideas about how to carry out investigatory stops
so as to discover contraband in vehicles. This research and the accompanying improvements in stop tactics and training convinced police leaders that investigatory
stops were an effective strategy.”).
Although he did not invent the pretext traffic stop, Bob Vogel, a former Florida
State Trooper and later the sheriff of Volusia County, Florida, helped perfect the practice as we know it today. As Professor David Harris details in his book PROFILES IN
INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002), Vogel began making a
name for himself and pretext stops by conducting several successful drug busts by
stopping drivers on Interstate 95 in Florida between February 1984 and March 1985.
Id. at 22. According to Vogel, he amassed “a list of . . . ‘cumulative similarities’—
Vogel prefers not to use the word profile”—in drivers who possessed drugs. Id. Vogel then used these characteristics when deciding which drivers to stop. Id. Initially,
courts were skeptical of Vogel’s technique and found some of his stops violated the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 22–23 (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th
Cir. 1986)). “But Vogel soon discovered a way around these problems. Instead of
using the similarities themselves as the legal justification for the stop, Vogel began
stating that the traffic offense was the reason he stopped the car.” Id. at 23. Vogel
went on to “conduct[] training classes for the DEA’s Operation Pipeline.” Id. at 22;
see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.3, at 470 n.2 (5th ed. 2012); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling
and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 170 n.25 (describing how “[t]he
federal government has strongly encouraged state and local law enforcement officers
to view the highway as a battleground in the war on drugs,” referencing Operation
Pipeline).
18. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 53.
19. Id. at 59.
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From one perspective, the use of pretext stops in the War on
Drugs specifically, and to fight crime generally, raises no legal alarm.
For most white Americans, modern application of this practice may
seem annoying but it is worth the cost in the fight against crime: A
motorist is stopped by the police. The officer then questions the motorist about his or her travel plans (and if there are passengers, they are
also questioned). Finally, a traffic summons or ticket may be issued.
While bothersome, this practice, viewed in the aggregate, does not
amount to a constitutional crisis. Moreover, on rare occasion, criminality is exposed as a result of the stop. 20
Black Americans, however, have a distinctly different perception of the situation. For King, the pretext stop was much more than a
“stop.” 21 The upshot was a frightening ride to jail: At one point during
the ride, “[p]anic seized” King because he believed the police were
going to lynch him. 22 Today, the modern pretext stop is on display
when a black motorist is seen standing on the side of a highway or city
street while police—typically white officers—search his vehicle.

20. The public’s perception of the consequences of pretext stops is distorted.
Local news outlets will occasionally highlight the major drug bust or discovery of
weapons during a traffic stop. Rarely, however, does local news media describe the
many innocent persons who are stopped and searched but no evidence of criminality
is discovered. Likewise:
Judges see only cases in which stops and searches yield illegal drugs
or illegal guns. They typically conclude that the harm to a driver
who is found with illegal drugs was outweighed by the benefits of
reducing crime. Judges do not see the many more stops and searches
that yield no drugs or guns, and they rarely ask whether these stops
harm the innocent, who are subjected to intrusive questions,
searches, handcuffing, and worse. Even the police, those closest to
the stop, rarely consider the possibility that investigatory stops may
cause deep and lasting harm.
Id. at 134.
21. Although the arrest of King for a speeding violation was obviously pretextual, under the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
the arrest was constitutional. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (interpreting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which ruled that pretextual traffic stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as also controlling the constitutionality of pretextual arrests).
22. BRANCH, supra note 2, at 160.
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Study after study has demonstrated that African Americans are targeted for pretext stops at a rate greater than white Americans:
The investigatory stop is why blacks are stopped at
much higher rates than whites and why police pursue intrusive lines of questioning and searches more commonly in stops of blacks than of whites. While whites
mainly experience conventional traffic-safety stops, racial minorities—blacks especially—commonly experience investigatory stops. . . . This racial difference in
police practices and people’s lived experience and
shared knowledge of these practices is why black people
commonly rate stops that they have experienced as unfair, while whites are generally more sanguine about
stops that they have experienced. It is a key reason why,
compared to whites, African Americans so distrust the
police. 23
For blacks, particularly black men, a pretext stop is unequivocal notice
of their inferior status in America. As Don Jackson, a former police
officer, put it not too long ago: “The black American finds that the
most prominent reminder of his second-class citizenship are the police.” 24
Surely, some must be thinking that Jackson exaggerates. Not
so. Jackson’s words were prompted, in part, by what happened to him
at the hands of police. On January 14, 1989, Jackson, a former police
officer from Hawthorne, California, attempted to document that Long
Beach, California police were targeting and harassing minority citizens
who lived in and visited Long Beach. Jackson and a companion were
stopped (ironically) while driving along Martin Luther King Boulevard. When Jackson asked the police why he was stopped, an officer
pushed Jackson through a plate-glass store window. Unknown to the
police, an NBC camera crew filmed the entire incident. 25 What happened to Jackson is experienced by thousands of black motorists

23. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 8.
24. Don Jackson, Police Embody Racism to My People, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1989, at A25.
25. Bill Girdner, Charge of Racism by California Police Is Latest in Long
Line, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1989.
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yearly, with lesser or greater consequences. Further, empirical studies
show that other blacks share Don Jackson’s view of the police. Even
when officers are polite during pretext stops, blacks describe “fear and
resentment of the experience.” 26 White drivers, by contrast, are not
routinely targeted for this practice. Thus, the ultimate problem is not
racist police officers, or even rude behavior by police during investigatory stops: “What makes inquisitive police stops so offensive to so
many African Americans and Latinos is not that the officers carrying
them out are impolite or even frankly bigoted, but that these stops are
common, repeated, routine, and even scripted.” 27
B. Pretext Stops and the Fourth Amendment
No doubt, many readers must be thinking that the Constitution
has something to say about pretext stops. 28 What we have described
is arbitrary and discriminatory police behavior. For a nation that is
rightly proud of some of its constitutional heritage, pretext stops
should be an anathema. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
which protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, should
presumably bar pretext stops. Whenever the police stop or “pull over”
a motorist for a traffic offense, they have seized that motorist within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 29 Why are pretext stops “reasonable”? Why are police acting reasonably when they stop a vehicle

26. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 2.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Cf. Eric F. Citron, Note, Right and Responsibility in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence: The Problem with Pretext, 116 YALE L.J. 1072, 1074 (2007) (“There
[is] something about this kind of police mindset—this liberated space for bad intentions—that should give the individual citizen both a moment of pause and the hope,
perhaps, that the Constitution forbids this form of roving pretextual surveillance.”);
id. at 1114 (“We, as a citizenry, should be concerned with pretext on the part of the
police because, perhaps more than anything else, pretext indicates that it may not be
appropriate to trust them to responsibly discharge the powers we have granted them
for the ends that these powers were intended to serve. Indeed, pretext ought to be a
core problem for the Fourth Amendment because it represents a breach of trust.”)
(emphasis added).
29. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007) (finding that in addition
to seizing the driver, a traffic stop also effectuates a seizure of the passenger); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stating that because a random stop of a
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to investigate a traffic offense, when their actual reason for the stop is
not supported by probable cause? During the founding era of America,
James Otis Jr. stirred revolutionary fervor when he rallied against the
British’s use of writs of assistance to search the homes and businesses
of colonists living in Massachusetts. 30 Otis told a British court that the
writs afforded “a power that places the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer.” 31 That’s exactly what pretext stops allow. 32 They allow officers to pick and choose who to stop and question.
Under normal circumstances, Montgomery police would not
have arrested a white pastor for driving thirty miles an hour in a
twenty-five mile-per-hour zone. Martin Luther King Jr., however, was
arrested and jailed. Race mattered. Likewise, many of the pretext
stops currently conducted on America’s roads and highways would not
occur but for the police’s desire to discover illegal narcotics, guns, or
other evidence of crime. “It is the fact of the departure from the accepted way of handling such cases that makes the officer’s conduct
arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness that in this context constitutes the
Fourth Amendment violation . . . .” 33 Nor is the constitutional evil

motorist is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, police must have probable cause
or reasonable suspicion that the motorist committed a traffic offense or other crime).
30. See 2 JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 139–42 (L. Kinvin
Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
31. Id. at 141–42.
32. Cf. Citron, supra note 28, at 1108 (“The principal problem with the Whren
[v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (ruling that pretext stops do not violate the
Fourth Amendment)] rule is that it transmogrifies the traffic law into the twenty-first
century equivalent of the general warrant—police can stop whomever they want on
the road, and for whatever reason, as long as they can claim probable cause to suspect
some minor, technical violation of the traffic laws.”); see also Barbara C. Salken, The
General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 224 (1989)
(“[T]he authority to arrest for a traffic offense creates power to search tantamount to
the unlimited and arbitrary authority that led to the adoption of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”).
33. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 170;[JH: this can be short cite according to BB 4.2] Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 366 (1974) (citation omitted) (ascribing to the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment “not merely an appreciation but a concern that one evil of the
existence of arbitrary power is the inevitability of its discriminatory exercise.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200528

2018
AM

110

1105 Maclin Reconcile WLR Clean Copy

(DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019 11:13

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 48

eliminated by the requirement that police have probable cause of a traffic offense before they are permitted to stop a vehicle: “[G]iven the
pervasiveness of such minor offenses and the ease with which law enforcement agents may uncover them in the conduct of virtually everyone, that difference hardly matters . . . .” 34
Finally, in the rare case where probable cause or other objective
evidence of a traffic violation is lacking, an officer can always “fabricate” probable cause.35 In modern times, this practice is known as
“testilying.” 36 These practices seem to contradict the Supreme Court’s

34. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 173; see also Bowers, supra note 15,
at 155 (“In petty public-order cases, probable cause merely translates to a troubling
form of ‘constitutional carte blanche’—a plenary authority to harass and humiliate,
to constrain and coerce, to behave in a manner antithetical to the purpose of the legality principle ‘as an important prophylaxis against the arbitrary and abusive exercise
of discretion in the enforcement of the penal law.’”) (citations omitted).
35. The classic description of this phenomenon was provided by Jerome
Skolnick:
[T]he policeman perceives his job not simply as requiring that he
arrest where he finds probable cause. In addition, he sees the need
to be able to reconstruct a set of complex happenings in such a way
that, subsequent to the arrest, probable cause can be found according
to appellate court standards. In this way, as one district attorney expressed it, “the policeman fabricates probable cause.” By saying
this, he did not mean to assert that the policeman is a liar, but rather
that he finds it necessary to construct an ex post facto description of
the proceeding events so that [they can] conform to legal arrest requirements, whether in fact the events actually did so or not at the
time of the arrest. Thus, the policeman respects the necessity for
“complying” with the arrest laws. His “compliance,” however, may
take the form of post hoc manipulation of the facts rather than before-the-fact behavior. Again, this generalization does not apply in
all cases. . . . But when he sees the case law as a hindrance to his
primary task of apprehending criminals, he usually attempts to construct the appearance of compliance, rather than allow the offender
to escape apprehension.
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 214–15 (2d ed. 1975).
36. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996); Joseph Goldstein, Police ‘Testilying’ Remains a Problem. Here Is How the Criminal Justice System Could Reduce It, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/nyregion/police-lying-new-
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frequent pronouncements that “the ‘core,’ ‘basic purpose’ and ‘central
concern’ of the Fourth Amendment have to do with protecting liberty
and privacy against arbitrary governmental interference.” 37 Put another way, precedent tells us that pretext traffic stops should be forbidden under the Fourth Amendment.
Sadly, but not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of the United
States came to the opposite conclusion. In a unanimous opinion,
Whren v. United States held that whenever police have probable cause
to believe that a motorist has violated a traffic law, a stop is constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 38 The subjective intent or motivation of the police, including police motives based on racial stereotypes or bias, are constitutionally irrelevant. 39 The only
thing that mattered to the Court was the existence of probable cause
that a traffic violation occurred. Speaking for the Justices, Justice
Scalia explained: “For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely is,
we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law
rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.” 40
II. THE IMPACT OF WHREN V. UNITED STATES
The facts of Whren occurred on June 10, 1993, when two plainclothes vice-squad officers, Ephraim Soto Jr. and Homer Littlejohn,
were patrolling a “high drug area” of Washington, D.C. 41 The officers
observed two young black men, Michael Whren and James Brown,
riding in a Nissan Pathfinder with temporary tags. 42 The officers were
suspicious of the Pathfinder because it waited at a stop sign for over

york.html; Joseph Goldstein, Promotions, Not Punishments, for Officers Accused of
Lying, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/nyregion/newyork-police-perjury-promotions.html; Joseph Goldstein, ‘Testilying’ by Police: A
Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html.
37. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 186 (citations omitted).
38. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
39. Id. at 813 (stating that prior precedents “foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the
individual officers involved”).
40. Id. at 819.
41. Id. at 808.
42. Id.
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twenty seconds, which they deemed too long. 43 They also claimed to
have observed Brown, the driver, look into Whren’s lap. 44 The officers
initiated the traffic stop because the pause at the stop sign violated a
D.C. traffic regulation that requires drivers to pay “full time and attention” to their vehicle while driving. 45 The officers made a U-turn to
stop the car, at which point Brown allegedly turned right without signaling and sped off. 46
Even though a D.C. police department regulation prohibited
plainclothes vice officers—like Soto and Littlejohn—from making
routine traffic stops unless they observed a violation “so grave as to
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others,” 47 they nonetheless
stopped the Pathfinder. 48 “The reason for the stop was obviously pretext.” 49 As soon as Soto approached the driver’s side of the car, he
observed what appeared to be two plastic bags of crack cocaine.50
Brown and Whren were arrested and the vehicle was searched, recovering more narcotics. 51
Brown and Whren were indicted on federal drug offenses. 52
During pre-trial motions, they argued that the legality of a traffic stop
should not turn on whether a reasonable officer could conduct a stop,
but whether a reasonable officer would conduct a stop. 53 And no reasonable plainclothes vice officer would have made this stop because it
was barred by departmental regulations. 54 But the lower courts rejected the defendants’ Fourth Amendment challenge that the stop was

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 810.
46. Id. at 808.
47. Id. at 815.
48. Id. at 808, 815.
49. Bowers, supra note 15, at 156.
50. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–09.
51. Id. at 809.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 809–10.
54. It comes as no surprise that the officers were apparently not disciplined for
violating departmental rules. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Song Remains the Same:
The Story of Whren v. United States, in RACE LAW STORIES 419, 439 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008) (“Nothing appears to have come of the fact that
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unconstitutional, stating that the officers acted in accordance with a
normal traffic stop, even though department regulation prohibited such
stops. 55
In the Supreme Court, racial profiling was a central plank of the
defendants’ constitutional claim. Emphasizing the lack of objective
evidence that Brown and Whren were involved in narcotics activities,
the defendants argued that they were stopped because of their race.56
They told the Court that racially-biased traffic enforcement was widespread throughout the country. 57 Indeed, the year the Court decided
Whren, court cases and other reports indicated that black motorists
were targeted for pretextual traffic stops in various jurisdictions. For
example, a New Jersey trial court found that New Jersey State Troopers had a de facto police practice of targeting black motorists for investigations and arrests on the southern portion of the New Jersey
Turnpike. 58 In North Carolina, an analysis of the 1995 patrol records
of the Special Emphasis Team of the North Carolina Highway Patrol,
whose goal was to interdict narcotics through traffic stops on Interstates 85 and 95, found that officers on the Special Emphasis Team
“charged black male drivers [with traffic offenses] at nearly twice the
rate of other troopers working the same roads.” 59 The study found that
black male drivers received almost 45% of the traffic citations issued
by the Team, while black male drivers received only 24.2% of the traffic citations issued by other North Carolina troopers patrolling the
same highways. 60 Moreover, the study explained that an independent
statistical expert believed that it was “wildly improbable” that two
groups of troopers patrolling the same roads would produce such disparate results by chance. 61 In their argument to the Court, the defend-

[the officers] . . . violat[ed] departmental regulations. Both officers continued serving
on the vice squad for many years.”).
55. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809.
56. Id. at 810.
57. Id.
58. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
59. Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Highway Drug Unit Focuses on Blacks, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 28, 1996, at A1.
60. Id.
61. Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Could It Happen by Chance?, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 28, 1996, at A17.
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ants in Whren insisted that if a traffic violation always justifies stopping a motorist, police will abuse their power and use traffic offenses
to evade otherwise applicable Fourth Amendment safeguards that prevent stopping and questioning motorists unless police have probable
cause or reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in criminal
conduct. 62
As mentioned above, none of this evidence or legal argument
persuaded the Justices to declare pretext stops unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. In fact, the Court was quite dismissive of the defendants’ constitutional arguments. After Whren, a vehicle stop is legal provided an officer can identify any traffic offense or minor violation of the law—no matter the officer’s real reason for the stop. The
result and message in Whren were not lost on law enforcement officials. Writing in Police Chief Magazine, which describes itself as the
professional voice of law enforcement, Roy Caldwell Kime recognized
the importance of the case and the fact that pretext stops are a staple of
law enforcement procedure. 63 Kime noted that had Whren been decided differently, “a major shift in the way crimes are investigated and
prosecuted in the United States would have occurred.” 64 Instead, according to Kime, the result in Whren “preserve[d]” the way police “use
traffic stops to uncover other criminal activities.” 65 The message to
police was clear. As one instructor for the California Highway Patrol
told another author: “After Whren . . . the game was over. We won.”66
On the other hand, Professor Wayne R. LaFave, the nation’s
foremost scholar on the Fourth Amendment, noted that the Whren
Court’s analysis of its own precedents was, “to put it mildly, quite disappointing.” 67 According to LaFave, Whren “managed to trivialize

62. Whren, 517 U.S. at 816–18.
63. Roy Caldwell Kime, U.S. Supreme Court Rules on Asset Forfeiture and
Traffic Stop Evidence, POLICE CHIEF, Aug. 1996, at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Police Chief article made no mention of the racial disparities generated by pretext stops.
66. Webb, supra note 17, at 127; cf. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 159 (commenting that the “technical requirement to have a lawful justification for a stop offers
no meaningful limitation on officers’ authority to make stops”).[JH: should be the
same citation sentence BB 1.2 and 1.3]
67. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 193.
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what in fact is an exceedingly important issue regarding a pervasive
law enforcement practice.” 68 When this assessment is combined with
the fact that the upshot of Whren means that police are conferred with
“virtual carte blanche to stop people because of the color of their skin
or for any other arbitrary reason,” 69 Whren ranks as one of the Court’s
worst opinions in the last thirty years and is deserving of the vast criticism it has received.
Over twenty years ago, one of us criticized the result in
Whren. 70 Indeed, condemnation of Whren’s holding and reasoning has
been widespread and continues unabated. 71 While there are no signs
that the current Court sees any reason to question, let alone reconsider,
its holding in Whren, the ramifications of Whren are significant.72
“More than 20 million Americans are stopped each year for traffic vi-

68. Id.
69. Id. § 1.4(e), at 171 (citation omitted).
70. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333
(1998); see also Tracey Maclin, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment
Problem with Pretextual Traffic Stops, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE
REHNQUIST COURT 90–101 (Michael Avery ed., 2009).
71. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 176 n.86 (citing articles criticizing Whren); see id. at 187 n.126 (citing cases and articles discussing the use of race
by police in drug courier profiles and in the enforcement of traffic laws).
72. Recently, Justice Ginsburg, who joined the Whren opinion without qualification, acknowledged the criticism Whren has generated. See District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 593–94 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She also stated
that, “I would leave open, for reexamination in a future case, whether a police officer’s reason for acting, in at least some circumstances, should factor into the Fourth
Amendment inquiry.” Id. (emphasis added). While Justice Ginsburg’s statement indicates that some members of the Court are aware of the criticism heaped on Whren,
her statement does not repudiate, let alone call for a reconsideration, of Whren. A
case filed in the 2017–2018 Term would have given the Court an opportunity to do
so. See United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied,
No. 17-1349, 2018 WL 1470947 (Oct. 1, 2018) (asking the Court to decide whether
the Fourth Amendment forbids a pretextual seizure of a motorist based solely on probable cause to suspect a civil parking infraction).
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olations, making this one of the most common ways in which the public interacts with the police.” 73 All motorists violate traffic codes frequently and with regularity. 74 When this fact is combined with the
knowledge that numerous studies demonstrate that racial minorities are
stopped at higher rates than white motorists, 75 the consequence is that
“[l]aw enforcement becomes a matter of ‘picking the man and then
searching the law books . . . to pin some offense on him.’” 76
Further, there is another, deadly, aspect of pretextual traffic
stops that we have not previously highlighted and has been ignored by
the Court but is no less deserving of the nation’s attention. Pretext
stops cause “problems for real people with real names,” are “hardly

73. EMMA PIERSON ET AL., A LARGE-SCALE ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES
POLICE STOPS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 1 (June 18, 2017),
https://5harad.com/papers/traffic-stops.pdf.
74. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 31 (stating that the consequence of the nation’s
many traffic laws means that “no driver can go for even a short drive without violating
some aspect of the traffic code. And since there are no perfect drivers, everyone’s a
violator.”); Bowers, supra note 15, at 151 (“Indeed, the overwhelming majority of
motorists break vehicle and traffic laws on an almost daily basis.”).
75. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 26 (“Police stop and search racial minorities
at disproportionately high rates, and these disparities have grown wider in recent
years.”); HARRIS, supra note 17, at 72 (“The data on stops are incontrovertible. The
information comes from many cities and involves many different police departments
and law enforcement contexts. . . . [A]ll of the data point in the same direction: minorities are stopped, questioned, and searched in numbers far out of proportion to
their presence in the driving population.”).
76. Bowers, supra note 15, at 156; see also PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD:
POLICING BLACK MEN 59–60 (2017):
A cop friend of mine invented a game that tells you everything you
need to know about the extraordinary consequences of Whren. The
cop takes my law students on ride-alongs in his squad car so they
can see what it’s like to be a police officer. The game is called Pick
a Car. My friend tells the students to pick any car they see on the
street and he will legally stop it. He says that he can follow any
driver and within a few blocks he or she will commit some traffic
infraction. Then he turns on his siren and flashing lights. He can
order the driver and passenger to exit their vehicle. He can pat them
down if he feels like his safety is threatened. This gives him an enormous amount of power. As a practical matter, if you are driving a
car, he can stop you at will.
IN
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trivial and anything but hypothetical,” 77 and sometimes fatal. This
lethal phenomenon is evident when we recall recent events and the
names of black motorists stopped for trivial traffic violations and then
killed by police: Philando Castile was pulled over for a cracked tail
light. Sandra Bland was pulled over for failing to use a turn signal
when changing lanes. Walter Scott was pulled over for a broken brake
light. Castile, Bland, and Scott would not live to challenge the police
decision to stop them.
Philado Castile was a black thirty-two-year-old school cafeteria
worker when he was pulled over by police officer Jeronimo Yanez in
Falcon Heights, Minnesota, on July 6, 2016, allegedly for a cracked
tail light. 78 This wasn’t Philando’s first traffic stop. “In a 13-year
span, Philando Castile was pulled over by police in the MinneapolisSt. Paul region at least 49 times, an average of about once every three
months, often for minor infractions.” 79 Philando’s girlfriend, Diamond
Reynolds, who was in the passenger seat, says that when Officer Yanez
approached the vehicle, Philando tried to tell him that he was carrying
a gun with a legal permit. 80 Philando was reaching for his identification when Officer Yanez shot him several times, killing him while Diamond and Philando’s four-year-old daughter watched. 81 A video
posted by Diamond of the incident went viral on a number of social
media platforms. 82
Walter Scott was fifty-years-old when North Charleston police
officer Michael Slager stopped him. After telling Scott that he was
stopped because his brake light was out, Slager returned to his cruiser

77. Bowers, supra note 15, at 140.
78. Sharon LaFraniere & Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Was Pulled Over 49
Times in 13 Years, Often for Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/before-philando-castiles-fatal-encounter-acostly-trail-of-minor-traffic-stops.html.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile
Said About the Shooting, WASH. POST (June 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officer-who-shotphilando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?utm_term=.aab9778a62d3.
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to check Scott’s identification. 83 A few minutes later, Scott exited his
vehicle and began to run away from the scene. 84 Cell phone footage
taken from a bystander shows Slager shooting Scott five times in the
back, just “for running away, simply for having a broken taillight.”85
In December 2017, Slager was sentenced to twenty years for murdering Walter Scott. 86
And then there is the tragic and mysterious death of Sandra
Bland in July 2015. The day after an interview with Prairie View
A&M University in Texas, Bland was stopped by Texas State Trooper
Brian Encinia. 87 Encinia claims he stopped Bland for changing lanes
without using a turn signal. 88 Dash camera footage of the incident reveals that a back-and-forth ensued between Bland and Encinia after
Encinia asked her to put out her cigarette, which she refused. 89 Bland
was eventually ordered from the vehicle, slammed to the pavement,
handcuffed, and arrested. 90 “One might respond that there was . . . no
need for Bland to lash out—that she mocked him, just as he mocked
her. But only one of them was a professional. More to the point, only
one of them had the law at his back.” 91 Encinia arrested Bland, who
was later charged with assaulting a public servant. 92 Three days later,

83. See Meridith Edwards & Dakin Andone, Ex-South Carolina Cop Michael
Slager Gets 20 Years for Walter Scott Killing, CNN (Dec. 7, 2017)
http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-sentencing/index.html.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Bowers, supra note 15, at 179.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 180–81 for a revealing transcript of the exchange between Bland
and Encinia.
90. Id. at 181–82.
91. Id. at 182.
92. Id.
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Bland was found dead in her jail cell; the cause of death was determined suicide by asphyxiation. 93 In September 2016, Bland’s family
settled for close to $2 million in a wrongful death suit. 94
While some readers may strongly disagree with this assessment,
we believe Whren’s holding contributed to the deaths of Castile, Scott,
and Bland. Perhaps Whren does not encourage police to target blacks
for traffic enforcement, but it certainly erects no constitutional obstacles to arbitrary and biased policing. 95 Recall the reaction to Whren
from the instructor for the California Highway Patrol: “After
Whren . . . the game was over.[JH: ellipses shouldn’t end the line] We
won.” 96 This instructor meant that Whren blessed pretext stops, notwithstanding the arbitrary and discriminatory impact caused by such
stops. Nationwide, police have grasped the authority given by Whren
and used it as a tool to perform arbitrary seizures to troll for evidence
of criminality despite lacking objective evidence for their investiga-

93. Id.; see also Debbie Nathan, What Happened to Sandra Bland?, THE
NATION (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/what-happened-to-sandra-bland/.
94. Mark Berman, Sandra Bland’s Family Says They Reached a $1.9 Million
Settlement in Wrongful Death Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/15/sandra-blandsfamily-reportedly-reaches-settlement-in-wrongful-death-lawsuit/?utm_term=.8bf1fe1b99b4.
95. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People:
The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 129
(2017) (“The claim that the Court enables and sometimes expressly authorizes racial
profiling might sound like hyperbole, but it is not.”). Concededly, Whren agreed with
the defendants’ claim that selectively targeting blacks for traffic enforcement was unconstitutional and suggested a constitutional claim against race-based enforcement of
traffic laws would be available under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). For too many
reasons to list here, this suggestion should not be taken seriously. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE,
supra note 17, § 1.4(f), at 189–92; Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, supra
note 70, at 337 n.22; David Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 326.
96. Webb, supra note 17, at 127.
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tions and intrusions. When seen from this angle, the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution becomes a sword for the police rather than a
shield for the individual. 97
Ultimately, the authority given by Whren facilitates part of the
bias contaminating America’s criminal justice system. 98 It promotes
arbitrary and racist policing. Although he was not focusing solely on
the problem of pretextual traffic stops, what Paul Butler said about how
America’s law enforcement officers enforce the nation’s criminal
codes captures the essence of our attack on Whren:
The problem is the criminal process itself. Cops routinely hurt and humiliate black people because that is
what they are paid to do. Virtually every objective investigation of a U.S. law enforcement agency finds that
the police, as policy, treat African Americans with contempt. In New York, Baltimore, Ferguson, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Cleveland, San Francisco, and many other cities, the U.S. Justice Department and federal courts have
stated that the official practices of police departments include violating the rights of African Americans. The police kill, wound, pepper spray, beat up, detain, frisk,
handcuff, and use dogs against blacks in circumstances
in which they do not do the same to white people. 99
Even the most privileged (and innocent) black Americans cannot escape the humiliation of being stopped, told to exit their vehicle,

97. Cf. DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: HOW OUR SEARCH
FOR SAFETY INVADES OUR LIBERTIES 41 (2011) (describing reliance on the reasonable suspicion standard rather than the probable cause standard contained in a memo
for a special unit of the Washington, D.C., police department that uses traffic stops to
look for guns: “For too long police officers have been trained to view the Constitution
of the United States and its judicial interpretations as placing rigid restrictions on what
law enforcement personnel can do on the street while shielding criminals from detection. . . . The members of the . . . Gun Recovery Unit have viewed the Constitution
and its associated case law as a law enforcement sword rather than a shield.”).
98. See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN BLACK AMERICA 197–215 (2017) (describing how pretext stops contribute to racial
disparities in America’s criminal justice system).
99. BUTLER, supra note 76, at 2–3 (citations omitted).
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and placed in handcuffs, or of having their hands put on the hood of a
vehicle and being frisked for weapons. 100 No person of color is immune. 101 This reality teaches us that “there is plenty of fear to go
around.” 102 Police fear black men because they associate blacks with
violence and criminality. 103 At the same time, black men do not trust
the police. “Even black men who share no other problem with the
black underclass share this one. The most successful, respectable

100. See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND
REDEMPTION 38–44 (2014) (detailing the author’s account of an evening sitting in his
car listening to music outside of his midtown Atlanta apartment when two officers
approached his vehicle. Stevenson got out of his car to enter his apartment when
officers drew their weapons and yelled “[m]ove and I’ll blow your head off,” worried
Stevenson may be a suspected burglar in the area); see also Devon W. Carbado,
(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 953–64 (2002) (providing
examples where Carbado recounts a number of his first interactions with police after
moving to the United States from the United Kingdom). For poor blacks living in
urban areas, the experience is worse and routine. See SHIPLER, supra note 97, at 55–
63, 65–71, 83–84 (describing police encounters while riding with a Gun Unit of the
D.C. police department):
Most citizens who are searched without giving voluntary consent
don’t go to court for the simple reason that they are entirely innocent. . . . [T]heir experiences add up to an invisible record across the
United States of countless unconstitutional searches. Each night, the
[Gun Unit] leaves dozens of such victims in its wake. Rushing
through blocks and courtyards, the officers consider the entire shift
a success if a single gun is found, even when numerous innocents
are stopped and frisked, their cars searched, their dignity assaulted,
their zones of privacy invaded for naught. . . . But the officers don’t
keep track of the fruitless searches, and neither does anyone else.
Id. at 66.
101. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58–59, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/10/23/thirteen-ways-of-looking-at-a-black-man (“There’s a moving violation that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black.”).
102. Bowers, supra note 15, at 172.
103. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION
AND THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM 170 (1988) (“[T]he patrolman said he investigated
the car in the first place because there were blacks in it, and with blacks ‘there is
always a greater chance of something wrong.’”); EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 42
(citation omitted) (“Of the various social pathologies attributed to blacks, one directly
implicates the police: the enduring stereotype that blacks are more likely to be violent, aggressive, and engage in crime.”);.
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black man can find himself in a one-sided confrontation with a cop
who thinks his first name is ‘Nigger’ and his last name is ‘Boy.’”104
This distrust is manifested in African Americans’ attitudes toward police pretext stops. “[B]lacks believe that the police are constantly
watching them and treat them as if they don’t belong; blacks fear that
every small offense will result in a stop and that every encounter with
the police can escalate and turn ugly.” 105
The result of this mix of police attitude towards blacks and
blacks’ distrust of the police is predictable: While officers “anticipate
the possibility of violence, however remote, during a police stop, black
drivers fear that any encounter with the police can, based [on] an inadvertent action or remark or misunderstanding, escalate into a humiliating and threatening experience.” 106 White Americans do not view police stops as ominous, or as a statement about their status as a citizen,
or, most importantly, as life threatening. “[F]or whites[,] a stop is just
a stop.” 107 Not so for blacks. The only thing “normal” or routine about
traffic stops “is the constant possibility of intrusive questions and
searches, and the implication that the driver looks like a criminal.” 108
There is another imbalance associated with police stops that is
rarely publicly discussed. When police confrontations with black driv-

104. Don Wycliff, Blacks and Blue Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1987, at E22,
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/08/opinion/the-editorial-notebook-blacks-andblue-power.html.
105. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 47 (citation omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 48; see also id. at 138:
Although white drivers do not like being stopped by the police,
their dislike is fundamentally different than African Americans’ fear
of investigatory stops and searches, and it has different implications
for whites’ sense of their place in society. No white driver told us
that he feared police stops. No white driver told us that she feared
what might transpire during police stops—of searches, handcuffing,
and arrest. No white driver told us that he tried to teach his children
how to avoid trouble in police stops.
108. Id. at 118.
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ers go bad or become deadly, “only the officer may rely upon his emotions and errors to claim an ex post excuse.” 109 If a black driver or
passenger makes an innocent mistake, for example, reaching for the
glove compartment to retrieve proof of registration or an insurance
card, or watching the officer too closely, 110 or reaching for a cell
phone, this action might be viewed by the officer as threatening, and
the result might be the use of deadly force by the officer. 111 This is
another reason why blacks view police stops with anger and fear. Randall Kennedy accurately described the perspective shared by many African Americans regarding their encounters with the police:
If the police may properly view race as an indicia of
suspicion, thereby making people of color more vulnerable to stops and questioning and all that stems from unwanted attention from the police, then it follows that
people of color will have more reason than white persons
to fear the police, regardless of their compliance with
law. 112
These feelings of fear and distrust of the police are not merely subjective or over-reactions to a few isolated encounters between black motorists and the police; numerous studies justify the views of many
blacks.
III. THE NUMBERS TODAY—“DRIVING WHILE BLACK” REMAINS A
REALITY
The past is the prologue. Evidence of arbitrary and discriminatory traffic enforcement is ever present. “Many studies find that the

109. Bowers, supra note 15, at 172 & n.206 (quoting TA-NEHISI COATES,
BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 71 (2015)) (“[T]he policeman who cracks you with a
nightstick will quickly find his excuse in your furtive movements.”).
110. Cf. Bowers, supra note 15, at 185 (quoting video of a traffic stop where an
officer told the driver that he stopped him “[b]ecause [the driver] made direct eye
contact” with the officer).
111. See also id. at 188 (citation omitted) (“One false move (and a bit of bad
luck) could describe the boundary between life and death—a killing that might be
excused, after the fact, as an erroneous but understandable reaction to the officer’s
reasonable perceptions of danger.”).
112. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 153 (1997).
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police stop African Americans at higher rates than whites.” 113 A study
published in 2014 found that blacks “are 270 percent more likely than
whites to be subjected to an investigatory stop.” 114 The same study
found that the racial effects of who is stopped “is compounded in what
happens during the investigatory stop.” 115 Police conducting pretext
stops “are five times more likely to search African Americans than
whites, but they are much less likely to find a gun or contraband in
searches of African Americans.” 116 In 2018, we continue to see the
consequences of Whren. Studies from the Department of Justice, Stanford University, and civil rights organizations indicate that racial disparities in traffic stops remain rampant.
A. Stanford Open Policing Project
Researchers at Stanford University set out to analyze racial disparities in police stops across the United States.117 Their study synthesized more than sixty million state patrol stops conducted in twenty
states between 2011 and 2015. 118 Some of the key findings include:
• Black drivers “[were] stopped more often than whites in
over 80% of the locations” they considered.119
• “[B]lack drivers have 19% higher odds of receiving a citation than white drivers,” and that for “typical young
male drivers” 72% of whites stopped for speeding receive a citation while 75% of black drivers stopped for
speeding receive a citation.120

113. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 52 (citation omitted); id. at 72–73 (“African
American drivers are more than two and a half times more likely than white drivers
to be subjected to [pretext] stops. Gender compounds this disparity in pretext stops:
African American men are almost four times more likely than white women to be
subjected to these stops.”).
114. Id. at 155.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 156.
117. See PIERSON, ET AL., supra note 73.
118. Id. at 1.
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id. at 6.
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• Black drivers are searched in 3.5% of stops, while white
drivers are searched in only 2.0% of stops.121
• Black drivers are more likely than whites to undergo
consent searches in the seven states where there is data
available (Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington). More
concretely, black drivers have 2.2 times the odds of
white drivers, and Hispanic drivers have 1.9 times the
odds of white drivers, of undergoing a consent
search.122
• Examining arrests, they found that black drivers are arrested in 2.8% of stops, while white drivers are arrested in 1.7% of stops.123 Put another way, black
drivers have 1.9 times the odds of being arrested compared to whites. 124
• An “outcome test” revealed that black and white drivers
who are stopped for traffic-related offenses and subsequently searched are both found to have contraband
28% of the time. In other words, black and white drivers have comparable “hit rates.”125 However, a
“threshold test” revealed that even though white and
black drivers had comparable “hit rates,” black drivers
are “searched on the basis of less evidence, indicative
of discrimination.” 126 This test revealed that the bar
for searching black drivers is less than white drivers.
It found that the threshold for white drivers was 20%
while the threshold for black drivers was 16%.127
B. Department of Justice Special Reports
During the years Barack Obama was president, the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) and its Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) authored
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
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a number of special reports that set out to discuss discrete issues in
policing. Two such reports are relevant to the issue of pretext stops.
In Police Behavior During Traffic and Street Stops, the DOJ
and BJS drew from data collected in the BJS 2011 Police-Public Contact Survey. 128 The survey synthesized individuals’ involuntary contact with police, namely during traffic stops and street stops. It also
examined the individual’s perception of police behavior during the
stop, as well as the legitimacy of the stop. 129 In relevant part, the study
found that:
• Black drivers (14%) were more likely than white drivers
(9%) to be told they were being stopped for a records
check.130
• Black drivers (4.7%) were nearly two times as likely as
white drivers (2.6%) to receive no justification for being stopped.131
• Black drivers (19%) were more likely than white drivers
(12.7%) to be told they were being stopped because of
a vehicle defect.132
• “White drivers pulled over by police (89%) were more
likely than black drivers (83%) to think that the police
behaved properly . . . .”133
• “Regardless of the reason for the traffic stop, black
(67%) and Hispanic (74%) drivers were less likely
than white drivers (84%) to believe the reason for the
stop was legitimate.”134

128. LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE
BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 (Morgan Young ed., 2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf.
129. Id. at 1.
130. Id. at 4. Police cannot stop a vehicle to perform a “records check.” Police
need probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense or criminal conduct
before stopping a vehicle. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
131. LANGTON & DUROSE, supra note 128, at 4.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 4.
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• “[A] greater percentage of black (7%) and Hispanic
(6%) drivers were ticketed than white drivers
(5%).”135
• Black (6.3%) and Hispanic (6.6%) drivers were more
likely to be searched by police after being stopped than
white drivers (2.3%).136
In Police Use of Nonfatal Force, 2002–11, the DOJ and BJS
revealed that “[t]raffic stops involving an officer and driver of different
races were significantly more likely to involve the threat or use of force
(2.0%), compared to traffic stops involving an officer and driver of the
same race (0.8%).” 137 It also found that of police contact made during
a traffic stop that involved threat or use of force, when the citizen was
white, threat or use of force was used 0.8% of the time.138 When the
citizen was black, however, threat or use of force was used 2.5% of the
time. 139 This study also found that in contact involving nonfatal force
that resulted in a personal search of the individual, “[b]lacks (9.4%)
were more likely to experience a personal search than whites
(2.8%).” 140
C. Department of Justice Investigation of the Ferguson,
Missouri Police Department
In addition to authoring special reports around discrete issues
like use of non-lethal force and police behavior during traffic and street
stops, the DOJ has also, at the request of President Barack Obama, initiated a number of investigations into the patterns and practices of
large metropolitan police departments. 141 These investigations often

135.
136.
137.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
SHELLEY HYLAND, LYNN LANGTON, & ELIZABETH DAVIS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POLICE USE OF NONFATAL FORCE, 2002–11, at 8 (Lynne McConnell & Jill
Thomas eds., 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/punf0211.pdf.
138. Id. at 4, tbl.3.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 8.
141. According to an NBC News report, “[u]nder the Obama Administration,
the [Department of Justice] opened 25 investigations into police departments and
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were prompted by highly-publicized police shootings and killings of
people of color during the Obama Administration. 142 The investigations were initiated to determine whether police departments were engaging in patterns or practices of unconstitutional conduct and if that
conduct disproportionately affected communities of color. 143
The most publicized of these investigations was that of Ferguson, Missouri: a city that became a hotbed of racial tension and the
epicenter of the Black Lives Matter movement following the tragic
death of eighteen-year-old Michael Brown at the hands of Ferguson
police officer Darren Wilson. At its core, the Ferguson investigation
revealed “discriminatory intent” as a contributing factor to racial disparities in Ferguson’s criminal justice process. 144
The report stated: “Ferguson police officers from all ranks told
us that revenue generation is stressed heavily within the police department, and that the message comes from City leadership.” 145 The report
also observed that “Ferguson’s police and municipal court practices
both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stereotypes. Ferguson’s own data establish clear racial disparities that adversely impact African Americans.” 146 As a consequence of these official priorities and practices, “many [Ferguson police] officers appear
to see some residents, especially those who live in Ferguson’s predominantly African-American neighborhoods, less as constituents to be
protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue.” 147 The
Justice Department study made plain that Whren encouraged the police
practices that afforded the Ferguson police unchecked discretion to
sheriff’s offices and was enforcing 19 [consent] agreements at the end of 2016, resolving civil rights lawsuits filed against police departments in Ferguson, Missouri;
Baltimore, New Orleans, Cleveland and 15 other cities.” Pete Williams, AG Sessions
Says DOJ to “Pull Back” on Police Department Civil Right Suits, NBC NEWS (Feb.
28, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ag-sessions-saystrump-administration-pull-back-police-department-civil-n726826.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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stop vehicles and to generate revenue through fines and other court
costs.
Some of the key findings from the Ferguson investigation include:
• “Data collected by the Ferguson Police Department
[“FPD”] from 2012 to 2014 shows that African Americans account for 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests made by FPD officers, despite comprising only 67% of Ferguson’s
population.” 148
• “African Americans are more than twice as likely as
white drivers to be searched during vehicle stops even
after controlling for non-race based variables such as
the reason the vehicle stop was initiated, but are found
in possession of contraband 26% less often than white
drivers, suggesting officers are impermissibly considering race as a factor when determining whether to
search.” 149
• “African Americans are more likely to be cited and arrested following a stop regardless of why the stop was
initiated and are more likely to receive multiple citations during a single incident. From 2012 to 2014,
FPD issued four or more citations to African Americans on 73 occasions, but issued four or more citations
to non-African Americans only twice.” 150
Investigators and attorneys with the DOJ also collected narratives from citizens. One narrative depicts how pretextual stops are
used to harass blacks:
In October 2012, police officers pulled over an African-American man who had lived in Ferguson for 16
years, claiming that his passenger-side brake light was
broken. The driver happened to have replaced the light

148.
149.
150.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
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recently and knew it to be functioning properly. Nonetheless, according to the man’s written complaint, one
officer stated, “let’s see how many tickets you’re going
to get,” while a second officer tapped his Electronic Control Weapon (“ECW”) on the roof of the man’s car. The
officers wrote the man a citation for “tail light/reflector/license plate light out.” They refused to let the man
show them that his car’s equipment was in order, warning him, “don’t you get out of that car until you get to
your house.” 151
Ultimately, the DOJ report on the Ferguson Police Department
depicted an organization that employs discriminatory and arbitrary
procedures and practices aimed at African Americans living and working in Ferguson. The report describes “a pattern of [police] stops without reasonable suspicion and arrests without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; infringement on free expression, as
well as retaliation for protected expression, in violation of the First
Amendment; and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” 152
A year after the DOJ report was issued, the DOJ and the City of
Ferguson entered into a consent decree regarding many of the findings
listed in the DOJ report. 153 The consent decree was “meant to ensure
protection of the constitutional and other legal rights of all members of
the community, improve Ferguson’s ability to effectively prevent
crime, enhance both officer and public safety, and increase public confidence in the Ferguson Police Department.” 154
Interestingly, to protect the “constitutional” rights of persons
living and working in Ferguson, the consent decree bars Ferguson police officers from employing pretext stops. 155 Think about this propo-

151. Id. at 17.
152. Id. at 2–3.
153. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016).
154. Id. at 1.
155. Id. at 19 (“FPD officers will not initiate an encounter with any person or
stop any person, or attempt to do so, for the purpose of checking for warrants even
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sition: to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of blacks living in Ferguson, the federal government required that Ferguson police officers
refrain from exercising police authority—pretextual traffic stops—that
a unanimous Supreme Court had ruled was constitutional. Put another
way:
In order to try to prevent the Ferguson police from treating African American residents unfairly, the police department’s constitutional powers have to be curtailed.
Not only is the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, insufficient to protect black people from
police abuse, it actually aids and abets the police abusers. 156
The aftermath of the DOJ report and the resulting consent decree unflinchingly demonstrates how Whren fosters arbitrary and discriminatory police law enforcement.
***
The above statistics and reports demonstrate the breadth of the
problem associated with pretext stops. But these studies cannot expose
the human judgments that are responsible for the consequences and
racial disparities caused by pretext stops. First, it is important to note
that pretext stops are not always initiated by racist law enforcement
officials or even individual officers. James Forman Jr.’s insightful
book, Locking Up Our Own, describes how Eric Holder, the nation’s
first African American Attorney General, helped initiate Operation
Ceasefire when he served as the first black United States Attorney for
the District of Columbia in the early 1990s. 157
The point of Operation Ceasefire was basic: “Stop cars, search
cars, seize guns.” 158 Specially trained units of the District of Columbia
police department would patrol high-crime areas of the city looking for
where there is an alternative pretext for the stop, unless the officer knows the person’s
identity and that the person has outstanding warrants for his/her arrest, prior to the
encounter.”); id. at 20 (“FPD officers will not conduct pretextual stops except where
the actual reason for the stop is to investigate a felony.”).
156. BUTLER, supra note 76, at 190.
157. FORMAN, supra note 98, at 194–211.
158. Id. at 197.
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suspicious vehicles with the goal of searching for guns inside the
cars. 159 Any traffic offense would justify a stop and the officers would
take it from there. Holder conceded the impact on the black community: “I’m not going to be naïve about it . . . . The people who will be
stopped will be young black males, overwhelmingly.” 160 The costs
were worth it, however, to protect blacks from gun violence. Holder
was not alone in embracing pretext stops as a way of reducing crime
in poor black neighborhoods. “Holder’s approach was embraced by
the black police chiefs who were running departments in several major
cities by the late 1990s.” 161
But Holder did not acknowledge “the immense volume of innocent people who would have to be stopped in order to obtain a sizeable
number of guns.” 162 Holder and others who supported pretext stops in
the District of Columbia should have known that such stops would
rarely disclose guns; Holder’s proposal was based in part on similar
programs in Kansas City, Missouri, and Indianapolis, Indiana. The
“Kansas City and Indianapolis studies showed how seldom guns were
actually found. In Kansas City, police in the target area seized guns in
only 3.57 percent of traffic stops, while in Indianapolis they found
guns in less than 1 percent of traffic stops.” 163 Most importantly, when
unveiling his proposal, Holder did not discuss the inevitable resentment felt by innocent persons who would become the eventual subjects
of pretext stops.
It is also important to understand that a pretext stop “is an institutionalized practice.” 164 Deploying pretext stops to search for guns,
as was done in the District of Columbia under Eric Holder’s watch, or
to look for drugs, as the New Jersey State Police did in the mid-1990s,
are well-considered policy choices. Moreover, as one study has
shown, “[p]olicies favoring proactive investigatory stops, by directing
159. Nancy Lewis, Holder Says Gun Campaign Will Enlist 50 D.C. Officers;
U.S. Attorney to be Host of Summit this Week, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1995, at D1.
160. FORMAN, supra note 98, at 203.
161. Id. at 204 (noting that Bernard Parks, the black police chief in Los Angeles, and Charles Ramsey, who became the police chief in the District of Columbia in
1998, shared Holder’s view).
162. Id. at 200.
163. Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
164. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 25.
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officers to look not for violations of the law but suspicious individuals,
activate departments’ and officers’ implicit stereotypes of which
neighborhoods and which individuals are suspicious.” 165 These policy
choices have consequences, some of which are extremely harmful.166
To confiscate a single illegal weapon, dozens of innocent motorists
must be stopped, questioned, and sometimes have their vehicles
searched while they are left standing on the side of the road to watch
police rifle through their possessions. In urban areas, the innocent persons most affected are black males, and they deeply resent the experience. 167
Finally, high-ranking police officials and prosecutors are misguided when they dismiss the resentment felt by innocent persons as
“victimology.” 168 In our racially polarized nation, the consequences
of pretext stops are vital. “Police stops convey powerful messages
about citizenship and equality. Across millions of stops, these experiences are translated into common stories about who is an equal member of a rule-governed society and who is subjected to arbitrary surveillance and inquiry.” 169 Law enforcement officials should heed the
advice of James Forman Jr. who observes that “pretext stops are a direct, easily remedied source of racial disparities in the criminal justice
system, and they are entirely within the power of law enforcement to
correct.” 170

165. Id. at 50.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 73–94.
167. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 1–3.
168. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/20/magazine/the-color-of-suspicion.html. (quoting D.C. Police Chief’s reaction to claims of racial profiling by the police: “‘Not to
say that it doesn’t happen, but it’s clearly not as serious or widespread as the publicity
suggests,’ says Chief Charles Ramsey of Washington. ‘I get so tired of hearing that
“Driving While Black” stuff. It’s just used to the point where it has no meaning. I
drive while black—I’m black. I sleep while black too. It’s victimology. Black people
commit traffic violations. What are we supposed to say? People get a free pass because they’re black?’”).[JH: since there are no pincites for newspapers, I do not think
you need a cite and then an id to have the quote]
169. EPP ET AL., supra note 14, at 2; id. at 113 (“African Americans are subjected to deeper investigatory intrusions not because they are poorer, less educated,
more disrespectful, or more distrustful of the police than whites. It is a racial disparity, pure and simple.”).
170. FORMAN, supra note 98, at 214 (citation omitted).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The authors in this symposium were asked to consider how far
America has come in the fifty years after the tragic assassination of
Martin Luther King Jr. Of course, America has made substantial progress on several fronts that would have pleased Dr. King had he lived
to see them. Many aspects of our criminal justice system, however,
would have deeply disappointed King. We are confident that the continued and widespread use of pretext stops and their attended consequences would have offended King. Looking forward, America can
honor Dr. King by ending pretext stops.
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